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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
For almost 75 years, the official seal of Lehigh County, 
Pennsylvania has included a Latin cross surrounded by nearly 
a dozen secular symbols of historical, patriotic, cultural, and 
economic significance to the community. The question 
presented is whether that seal violates the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. Consistent with the Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in American Legion v. American Humanist 
Association, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019), we hold it does not.  
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I 
In December 1944, the Lehigh County Board of 
Commissioners unanimously adopted the seal at issue and 
agreed to purchase a flag depicting it. Although the record 
contains no evidence of the three Commissioners’ 
contemporaneous understandings of the imagery used in the 
seal, Commissioner Harry D. Hertzog, who designed and voted 
for the seal, explained two years later: “in center of Shield 
appears the huge cross in canary-yellow signifying Christianity 
and the God-fearing people which are the foundation and 
backbone of our County.” App. 99. This appears to be the only 
available explanation of the cross’s initial inclusion in the seal. 
The cross is partially obscured by a depiction of the Lehigh 
County Courthouse and surrounded by many other symbols 
representing the County’s history, patriotism, culture, and 
economy.1 See infra Appendix A. 
The seal appears on County-owned property and on 
various government documents, as well as on the County’s 
website, so Lehigh County residents encounter it regularly. 
The Freedom from Religion Foundation (FFRF) wrote to the 
County in November 2014 to complain about the seal and 
                                                 
1 These include the United States and Pennsylvania 
flags, a red heart representing the County Seat of Allentown, a 
map of the County’s boundaries, two books and the lamp of 
learning representing education, red bunting representing the 
clothing manufacturing industry, the Liberty Bell, a bison head 
representing the County Preserve and its protected hoofed 
animals, industrial buildings representing the County’s cement 
and other industries, and grain silos and a cow representing 
agriculture. See infra Appendix A. 
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request its use be discontinued—the first such complaint in the 
seal’s history. After a series of meetings and attempts to gather 
information about the seal, the Board of Commissioners voted 
unanimously to retain the seal in March 2015. Responding to 
FFRF by letter, the County stated the cross’s “presence . . . on 
the seal among all the other items of historical significance has 
the secular purpose of recognizing the history of the County” 
and “honor[s] the original settlers of Lehigh County who were 
Christian.” App. 310. The present-day Board did not know 
why the 1944 Commissioners decided to include the cross, and 
interpreted Hertzog’s 1946 statement to mean the cross—like 
other symbols on the seal—represented “elements that were 
important to the early settlers” of Lehigh County. App. 266–
67. 
FFRF and four of its members who reside in Lehigh 
County filed this lawsuit in 2016. After both parties moved for 
summary judgment, the District Court denied the County’s 
motion and granted FFRF’s. It found the seal unconstitutional 
under the Lemon test as modified by the endorsement test, after 
asking whether the cross lacked a secular purpose and whether 
a reasonable observer would perceive it as an endorsement of 
religion. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Cty. of Lehigh, 
2017 WL 4310247, at *9–10 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2017) (citing 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)). The District Court 
explained in dicta that although FFRF’s claim would fail under 
the Establishment Clause as originally understood, the Court 
was obliged to apply the Lemon-endorsement test despite its 
shortcomings. The County timely appealed, but after oral 
argument we held the case pending resolution of American 
Legion and then asked the parties to provide supplemental 
briefing based on that decision. We now hold that Lemon does 
not apply to “religious references or imagery in public 
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monuments, symbols, mottos, displays, and ceremonies” like 
the seal. 139 S. Ct. at 2081 n.16 (plurality opinion). As the 
Supreme Court held in American Legion, such longstanding 
symbols benefit from “a strong presumption of 
constitutionality.” Id. at 2085. And because the thin record in 
this case does not overcome that presumption, we will reverse 
the District Court’s order. 
II 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331. We have jurisdiction over this timely appeal under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review a party’s standing to sue de novo. 
Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 266 (3d Cir. 
2014). The same is true of our review of the District Court’s 
summary judgment. Id. at 265. 
III 
In the Establishment Clause context, “a community 
member . . . may establish standing by showing direct, 
unwelcome contact” with a government display alleged to 
violate the Constitution. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. 
New Kensington Arnold Sch. Dist., 832 F.3d 469, 479 (3d Cir. 
2016).2 The Supreme Court appears to adhere to this approach, 
                                                 
2 The County argues New Kensington is at odds with 
Americans United for Separation of Church & State v. Reagan, 
786 F.2d 194 (3d Cir. 1986), and Town of Greece v. Galloway, 
572 U.S. 565 (2014). Neither case requires us to reconsider 
Establishment Clause standing here. The Reagan plaintiffs 
asserted a generalized, stigmatic injury based on diplomatic 
recognition of the Vatican and related congressional funding, 
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resolving many offended-observer standing cases on the merits 
without addressing standing. See, e.g., Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. 
at 2090; McCreary Cty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005); 
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005). But see Steel Co. v. 
Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998) (“[D]rive-
by jurisdictional rulings of this sort . . . have no precedential 
effect.”). We will not abrogate New Kensington’s relaxed 
standard for Establishment Clause plaintiffs and instead leave 
it to the Supreme Court—or this Court sitting en banc—to 
determine whether to discard it.3 
The County does not dispute that the individual 
Plaintiffs here have experienced a variety of direct and 
unwelcome contacts with the seal. For example, Plaintiffs 
Berry, Meholic, Simpson, and Winkler have encountered the 
seal as displayed in the County Commissioners’ public 
meeting room, on the County website, in the County Sheriff’s 
Office, on real estate tax bills, when reporting to the County 
courthouse for jury duty, on County flags placed throughout 
the County, and on County-owned vehicles. The individual 
plaintiffs are also residents of the relevant community (Lehigh 
                                                 
as opposed to direct and unwelcome contact. Reagan, 786 F.2d 
at 200–01. And the portions of Town of Greece the County 
cites involve substantive Establishment Clause analysis, not 
threshold issues of standing.  
3 See generally Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2098–103 
(Gorsuch, J., concurring in judgment) (arguing the concept of 
offended-observer standing is inconsistent with Article III’s 
standing requirements); City of Edmond v. Robinson, 517 U.S. 
1201, 1201–03 (1996) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting from the 
denial of certiorari) (arguing for the Court to resolve the 
question of offended-observer standing). 
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County). See New Kensington, 832 F.3d at 478. For these 
reasons, we hold they have standing to challenge the seal under 
the Establishment Clause. 
IV 
The Establishment Clause precludes Congress from 
passing any law “respecting an establishment of religion.” U.S. 
CONST. amend. I. The original public understanding of 
“establishment” informs the Supreme Court’s more recent 
focus on evaluating challenges to government action in the 
context of historical practices and understandings. See Am. 
Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2074; Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 
U.S. 565, 576–77 (2014); Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 682–84 
(plurality opinion); id. at 702–04 (Breyer, J., concurring in 
judgment). 
Before American Legion, the Lemon-endorsement test 
directed courts to divine the intent behind challenged 
government action or to ascertain the “reasonable observer’s” 
perception of that action.4 That’s not to say the test guided the 
Supreme Court itself. Well before American Legion, the Court 
                                                 
4 Lemon’s three prongs are (1) secular legislative 
purpose, (2) principal or primary effect that neither advances 
nor inhibits religion, and (3) lack of excessive government 
entanglement with religion. 403 U.S. at 612–13. The 
endorsement test modified Lemon by asking whether a 
“reasonable observer familiar with the history and context of 
the display would perceive the display as a government 
endorsement of religion.” Modrovich v. Allegheny Cty., 385 
F.3d 397, 401 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 
U.S. 668, 687, 692 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring)). 
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and individual Justices repeatedly indicated the test was not 
binding. See, e.g., Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 699–700 (Breyer, J., 
concurring in judgment) (observing that the Court was unable 
to adopt a “single mechanical formula that can accurately draw 
the constitutional line in every case” (citation omitted)); 
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984) (eschewing “any 
single test or criterion in this sensitive area” (citations 
omitted)); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973) (stating 
Lemon provides “no more than helpful signposts”). Sometimes 
the Court ignored the test altogether. See, e.g., Town of Greece, 
572 U.S. 565 (omitting any mention of Lemon); Van Orden, 
545 U.S. 677 (no reliance on Lemon in either the plurality or 
Justice Breyer’s concurrence); Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n v. 
Am. Atheists, Inc., 565 U.S. 994 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting 
from the denial of certiorari) (collecting more cases that ignore 
Lemon). Although American Legion did not exorcise what 
Justice Scalia likened to a “ghoul in a late-night horror movie 
that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after 
being repeatedly killed and buried,” Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. 
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) 
(Scalia, J., concurring), the Court did make clear that the 
Lemon-endorsement framework does not apply to our 
evaluation of the Lehigh County seal. 
American Legion confirms that Lemon does not apply 
to “religious references or imagery in public monuments, 
symbols, mottos, displays, and ceremonies.” 139 S. Ct. at 
2081–82 & n.16 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 2097 
(Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (agreeing that Lemon 
does not apply to such cases); id. at 2102 (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring in judgment) (same). Instead, informed by four 
considerations, the Court adopted “a strong presumption of 
constitutionality” for “established, religiously expressive 
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monuments, symbols, and practices.” Id. at 2085. Those 
considerations include that: (1) identifying such symbols’ 
original purpose or purposes is often difficult; (2) the original 
purposes may multiply over time, especially through decisions 
to retain a symbol; (3) the message conveyed by the symbol 
may change over time; and (4) removing a longstanding 
symbol imbued with “familiarity and historical significance” 
may appear hostile to religion. Id. at 2082–85. And the only 
ways the Court suggested challengers might be able to 
overcome the presumption of constitutionality would be to 
demonstrate discriminatory intent in the decision to maintain a 
design or disrespect based on religion in the challenged design 
itself. See id. at 2074, 2089. 
In its supplemental brief filed after American Legion 
was decided, FFRF makes two points. It argues that the facts 
of this case show American Legion’s presumption does not 
apply and, even if it did, the presumption is overcome. Neither 
argument proves availing. 
On the first point, American Legion held that the 
presumption applies to longstanding symbols just like the 
Lehigh County seal. What’s more, the Supreme Court’s four 
considerations for applying a presumption of constitutionality 
to the Bladensburg Peace Cross apply equally here. For these 
reasons, we begin our evaluation of the Lehigh County seal 
with “a strong presumption of constitutionality” for this 
longstanding symbol. Id. at 2085.  
And on the second, it’s clear on the record in this case 
that Plaintiffs have not overcome the presumption. The 
evidence does not show the sort of “discriminatory intent” in 
maintaining a symbol or “deliberate[] disrespect[]” in a design 
itself that American Legion suggested could overcome the 
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presumption. See id. at 2074, 2089. So the seal is plainly 
constitutional under the most recent frameworks the Supreme 
Court has used to evaluate similar, established government 
symbols, monuments, and practices with religious elements.5 
A 
To begin with, the notion that the presumption of 
constitutionality does not apply to the Lehigh County seal is a 
nonstarter. In American Legion, the Supreme Court held that 
the presumption applies to all “established, religiously 
expressive monuments, symbols, and practices.” Id. at 2085. 
Lehigh County’s seal checks those boxes. It was adopted 
almost 75 years ago, so it is established. It depicts a Latin cross, 
so it is religiously expressive. And it represents the County and 
its government, so it is a symbol. Satisfying these three 
                                                 
5 We therefore distinguish this case from our recent 
Establishment Clause decisions in Doe v. Indian River School 
District, 653 F.3d 256, 282–83 (3d Cir. 2011), and 
Stratechuk v. Board of Education, South Orange-Maplewood 
School District, 587 F.3d 597, 604–06 (3d Cir. 2009). Both 
involved the public-school context, not longstanding 
government symbols, and both predate American Legion and 
Town of Greece. We further recognize that American Legion 
abrogates the reasoning (i.e., application of Lemon) in both 
Modrovich, 385 F.3d 397, and Freethought Society of Greater 
Philadelphia v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2003). 
Neither case—decided before American Legion, Town of 
Greece, and Van Orden—binds our decision here because of 
that intervening Supreme Court precedent. See In re Krebs, 527 
F.3d 82, 84 (3d Cir. 2008). 
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conditions triggers the “strong presumption of 
constitutionality.” Id. 
Moreover, although none is required for the 
presumption to apply, all four of American Legion’s 
considerations further confirm the presumption’s applicability: 
First, 75 years after the seal’s adoption, the only 
available evidence of original purpose is Commissioner 
Hertzog’s statement made two years after the County adopted 
the seal. Discerning the actual purpose of the seal’s adoption is 
made more difficult not only by the passage of time, but also 
because Hertzog was just one of three commissioners. These 
problems highlight why the Supreme Court in American 
Legion expressed skepticism about the ability of courts to 
determine the original purposes of longstanding symbols. See 
id. at 2082. 
Context also matters. Where a display includes many 
other monuments or symbols, the undeniably religious 
symbolism of one monument may take on a “dual significance, 
partaking of both religion and government.” Van Orden, 545 
U.S. at 691–92 (plurality opinion); see id. at 702 (Breyer, J., 
concurring in judgment); see also Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 
2077–78, 2089 (finding the Bladensburg Peace Cross’s own 
secular elements and situation among other war memorials 
provided greater context, even though the closest was 200 feet 
away). 
Second and third, the seal’s original purposes and 
messages—like those of the Bladensburg Peace Cross—have 
likely multiplied and changed over time. Courts are not to 
focus solely on the religious component in challenged 
government displays; they should consider the overall message 
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conveyed and the broader context in which the display appears. 
See Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2074–78, 2089–90; Van Orden, 
545 U.S. at 700 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment). Religious 
symbols within such a display “can become embedded features 
of a community’s landscape and identity,” valued for more 
than just “their religious roots.” Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2084. 
“Familiarity itself can become a reason for preservation.” Id. 
(citing Maryland’s flag, “which has included two crosses since 
1904,” and religious place names); see id. at 2083 (“Even if the 
original purpose of a monument was infused with religion, the 
passage of time may obscure that sentiment. . . . [A] 
community may preserve such monuments, symbols, and 
practices for the sake of their historical significance or their 
place in a common cultural heritage.”). And such symbols may 
speak of the community that adopted them, representing what 
people “felt at the time and how they chose to express their 
sentiments,” including acknowledgement of “the centrality of 
faith” to those the symbol represented. Id. at 2086, 2089. All 
this explains why the presumption of constitutionality may 
control even where there is direct evidence of religious 
motivation by some officials involved in adopting, designing, 
and dedicating the symbol. Cf. id. at 2076–77 (noting the 
presence of such historical evidence, but nevertheless rejecting 
an Establishment Clause challenge). Those purposes may 
multiply, and those messages may change, over time. 
The Latin cross at issue here no doubt carries religious 
significance. See id. at 2093–94 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 
And its designer—who also voted for its adoption as a 
Commissioner—said that significance motivated him, at least 
in part, to include it in the County seal. But more than seven 
decades after its adoption, the seal has become a familiar, 
embedded feature of Lehigh County, attaining a broader 
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meaning than any one of its many symbols. The County 
recognized this “historical significance” and the seal’s 
representation of “elements that were important to the early 
settlers” of Lehigh County in its 2015 decision to retain the 
seal. App. 266–67. The County also noted the cross “honor[s] 
the original settlers of Lehigh County who were Christian.” 
App. 310. So the seal reflects both what its initial adopters “felt 
at the time” and what those who retained it believed just a few 
years ago. Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2089.  
Although it’s undeniably the focal point of the Lehigh 
County seal, the Latin cross does not stand alone. See infra 
Appendix A. It appears behind a depiction of the county 
courthouse and is surrounded by nearly a dozen other symbols 
representing various aspects of Lehigh County. See supra note 
1. Whether historical, patriotic, cultural, or economic, they are 
all secular symbols. The seal as a whole therefore “suggests 
little or nothing of the sacred,” even though the Latin cross 
alone has undeniably religious significance. Van Orden, 545 
U.S. at 700–01, 702 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment). In 
short, the seal as a whole falls well short of establishing a 
religion. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 686. 
Finally, history also plays a significant role. See Town 
of Greece, 572 U.S. at 576 (“[T]he Establishment Clause must 
be interpreted ‘by reference to historical practices and 
understandings.’” (quoting Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater 
Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 670 (1989) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part))); 
Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 702 (Breyer, J., concurring in 
judgment) (describing the newly contested display’s 
unchallenged presence for 40 years as “determinative” that the 
“monument conveys a predominantly secular message”). A 
practice’s fit within our Nation’s public traditions may confirm 
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its constitutionality. See Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 577. The 
94-year, challenge-free history of the Bladensburg Peace Cross 
(including over 50 years of ownership by the government) also 
entitled it to a “strong presumption of constitutionality.” Am. 
Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2085. So too here. 
The Lehigh County seal fits comfortably within a long 
tradition of State and municipal seals and flags throughout our 
Republic that include religious symbols or mottos, which 
further confirms its constitutionality.6 See Am. Legion, 139 S. 
Ct. at 2084. It also abided over 70 years without complaint—
and no evidence suggests this was “due to a climate of 
intimidation.” Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 702 (Breyer, J., 
concurring in judgment). So the record suggests, “more 
strongly than can any set of formulaic tests[,] that few . . . are 
likely to have understood the [cross’s inclusion] as 
amounting . . . to a government effort to favor a particular 
religious sect.” Id. 
Requiring the cross’s extirpation, on the other hand, 
may very well exhibit “a hostility toward religion that has no 
place in our Establishment Clause traditions,” inviting disputes 
over similar longstanding symbols nationwide. Id. at 704. 
Albeit in dicta, the American Legion Court disapproved of 
eradicating religiously inspired places, symbols, and mottos—
                                                 
6 FFRF argues we may not consider some of the 
County’s evidence of certain symbols’ histories and purposes, 
but we note the prevalence of undoubtedly religious symbols, 
many of them crosses, in such contexts for quite some time. 
See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., GEN. PROVIS. § 7-202(c) (2014). 
And the Supreme Court has as well. Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 
2084 (highlighting Maryland’s flag). 
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including Lehigh County’s own Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. See 
Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2084 (noting that religion 
“undoubtedly motivated” namers of places like Bethlehem and 
Las Cruces, New Mexico, as well as designers of symbols like 
Maryland’s state flag and mottos like Arizona’s “Ditat Deus” 
(“God enriches”)); id. at 2087 (explaining that courts changing 
the names of cities like San Diego or Los Angeles because of 
their religious origins would convey hostility toward religion). 
Consistent with the Supreme Court’s admonition on this score, 
we too decline to invite such dissension. 
B 
FFRF’s fallback argument is that it has overcome the 
presumption of constitutionality. The Supreme Court 
suggested that challengers could overcome the presumption by 
demonstrating a “discriminatory intent in the selection of the 
design of the memorial or the decision of a [government body] 
to maintain it.” Id. at 2074. The Court also focused on whether 
the monument was designed or built to “deliberately 
disrespect[]” Jewish, Catholic, or black soldiers. Id. at 2089. 
Here, FFRF tries in vain to show that the seal 
deliberately disrespects members of other faiths. It focuses on 
the statement Commissioner Hertzog made two years after the 
seal was created. But his statement that “Christianity and the 
God-fearing people . . . are the foundation and backbone of our 
County,” App. 99, does not, under American Legion, doom the 
cross’s inclusion in perpetuity, because “no matter what the 
original purpose[] for the [adoption of a symbol], a community 
may wish to preserve it for very different reasons.” Am. Legion, 
139 S. Ct. at 2085. Here, the Board’s intent in retaining the 
seal—to continue “recognizing the history of the County,” 
App. 310—was plainly non-discriminatory. Without evidence 
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of “discriminatory intent” in the County’s recent decision to 
maintain the seal or “deliberate[] disrespect[]” in the seal’s 
design itself, the record compels the conclusion that FFRF and 
its members have not overcome American Legion’s “strong 
presumption of constitutionality.” Id. at 2074, 2089. 
* * * 
Our task turns on “the ability and willingness to 
distinguish between real threat and mere shadow.” Sch. Dist. 
of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 308 (1963) 
(Goldberg, J., concurring). The Establishment Clause’s 
original public meaning and the Court’s most recent 
interpretation of it make two things clear: the Lemon-
endorsement test does not apply to Lehigh County’s seal, and 
this 75-year-old seal casts only that mere shadow. “It has 
become part of the community.” Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 
2089. And that community can retain or remove it in keeping 
with the First Amendment. See id. at 2094 (Kavanaugh, J., 
concurring). Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the 
District Court.  
19 
 
APPENDIX A 
 
 
